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CHAPTER 3
‘Britain Alone’: A View from Northern
Ireland
Gordon Anthony*
§3.01 INTRODUCTION
Northern Ireland is often said to be different from the rest of the United Kingdom not
just because of its geographical detachment from Britain (‘alone’?), but also because of
its historical and contemporary systems of devolved government.1 In terms of possible
UK withdrawal from the European Union, its contemporary system of government –
which is premised upon a particular form of consociationalism2 – presents something
of a paradox. On the one hand, the fact that the devolved institutions in Northern
Ireland have worked within policy areas that have been heavily conditioned by EU law
might be expected to provide an opportunity for reinvigorated local decision-making in
the event of EU withdrawal,3 particularly as the UK moves towards a form of
* I wish to thank a number of friends and colleagues for their comments on earlier versions of this
chapter: Pat Birkinshaw; Leanne Cochrane; Brice Dickson; John Morison; Thomas Muinzer; and
Alex Schwartz. All opinions and errors are mine.
1. On the historical systems see B. Hadfield, The Constitution of Northern Ireland (SLS Legal
Publications, Belfast, 1989) and J. Morison & S. Livingstone, Reshaping Public Power: Northern
Ireland and the British Constitutional Crisis (Sweet and Maxwell 1995). For current structures see
C Knox, Devolution and Governance in Northern Ireland (Manchester U. Press, 2010).
2. See J. McGarry & B. O’Leary, Constitutional Theory, Northern Ireland’s Conflict, and its Agree-
ment. Part I: What Consociationalists Can Learn From Northern Ireland 41 Govt. & Opposition 43
(2006).
3. For an insight into the extent of overlap between EU policy and NI competence see, Report on
Assembly Committee Priorities for European Scrutiny in 2014, NIA 159/11-15, Committee of the
Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, available at http://www.niassembly.
gov.uk/Assembly-Business/Committees/Office-of-the-First-Minister-and-deputy-First-Minister/
Reports/.
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‘devo-max’ in the light of the Scottish referendum of 18 September 2014.4 However,
even leaving aside the obvious question of how far Northern Ireland’s interests would
truly become distinct from those of the EU in the event of withdrawal, its governmental
structures may well frustrate the potential within any new political settlement. This is
because the devolved institutions function on the basis of compulsory power-sharing
between the major political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly and within
constitutional rules that allow Northern Ireland’s main ethno-national groups to block
initiatives in the Assembly and in the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.5 Such
structures can inevitably have a limiting influence on the development of policy, and
there have been a number of high-profile disputes in areas that have included planning
law and, most recently, welfare reform.6 EU withdrawal might therefore give rise to a
notionally enhanced democratic context, but it may well prove to be one that is neither
efficient nor effective.
The possibility of withdrawal also has implications for at least two other
important aspects of governance in Northern Ireland. The first of these is, of course,
relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which are set within
the broader framework of relations between the UK and Irish states. At the level of
inter-state cooperation, UK withdrawal would have the immediate effect of placing a
land border between Northern Ireland and an EU Member State, where some commen-
taries have already noted that problems may arise in relation to matters of policing and
criminal justice.7 However, it is at the level of North/South inter-governmental
relations that the impact of withdrawal could be expected to be at its most pronounced.
Those relations entered a new period of formalised cooperation after the Belfast (or
Good Friday) Agreement of 1998, which provided for the creation of a North-South
Ministerial Council and a range of ‘implementation’ bodies in areas of mutual interest.8
Cooperation within that framework has since been largely positive,9 although much of
4. See, at the timeofwriting, the reportof the ‘SmithCommission’ondevolution inScotlandathttps://
www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.
pdf and the Scotland Bill 2015 at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scotland-bill-2
015-legislation-and-explanatory-notes; the Wales Act 2014, available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2014/29/contents/enacted; and the ‘Stormont House Agreement’ of 23 Dec. 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390672/
Stormont_House_Agreement.pdf, as read with ‘A Fresh Start – the Stormont Agreement and
Implementation Plan’, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-north
ern-ireland.
5. Northern Ireland Act 1998, Part III, esp section 28B; and section 42. Some slight changes to the
workings of the rules are, however, imminent: see the ‘Stormont House Agreement’, supra n. 4,
paragraphs 57-58, as read with ‘A Fresh Start’, supra n. 4, Appendix F3.
6. See, as regards planning law, A. Schwartz, ‘Petitions of Concern’, Northern Ireland Assembly
Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series, 20 Mar. 2014, at p. 4. On welfare see http://www.bbc.co
.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-32894371, as now read in the light of A Fresh Start, n 4 supra.
7. ‘Leaving the EU’, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 13/42, at pp 98–99 (available
at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/RP13-42/leaving
-the-eu).
8. J. Coakley, The Belfast Agreement and the Republic of Ireland in Aspects of the Belfast Agreement
Chapter 12 (R. Wilford ed., Oxford U. Press 2001).
9. But see Re De Brun and McGuinness’ Application [2001] NI 442; and Northern Ireland Act 1998,
section 52A, as inserted by the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, section 12.
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it has occurred under the influence of EU law and, in some instances, with direct EU
funding. Withdrawal might on that basis be expected to complicate North/South
relations and to raise questions about how cross-border initiatives might find support
from within Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions.
The other aspect of governance concerns equality and human rights law, where
the prospect of EU withdrawal must be assessed alongside related debates about the
possible repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the introduction of a British Bill of
Rights. Although there is no necessary cause and effect between EU membership and
the Human Rights Act 1998, Euro-scepticism in the UK has increasingly included
criticisms of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and it led the Conservative
Party to commit itself to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 in the (subsequently
realised) event that it won the 2015 general election.10 For Northern Ireland, a
‘withdrawal and repeal’ package may well present very significant challenges, particu-
larly given the role that equality and human rights law have played before, during, and
after the Belfast Agreement of 1998. For instance, one immediate question would
concern the future jurisprudential basis for some aspects of equality law in Northern
Ireland, where EU legislation and decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) have been central to some of the Northern Ireland case law. However,
even more fundamental is the matter of how human rights (beyond those associated
with non-discrimination) might be protected in the event of withdrawal and repeal.
This is essentially a point about Part 6 of the Belfast Agreement, which envisaged that
rights would receive enhanced protection in Northern Ireland and that related initia-
tives would be developed in the Republic of Ireland and on an all-Ireland basis.11 While
it might be doubted how far an integrated approach to the protection of rights has
actually been achieved (or, indeed, is achievable),12 the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(the EU Charter) are sources of law both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of
Ireland.13 UK withdrawal would of course immediately change that position in respect
of the EU Charter, while repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 would mean that the very
European rights standards that have (arguably) aided Northern Ireland’s transition
from conflict would no longer be directly enforceable in court.14 Repeal of the Human
Rights Act 1998 might also be expected to place the UK government in breach of its
commitments under the Belfast Agreement, notably to:
complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on
Human Rights, with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the
10. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21726612: ‘Theresa May: Tories to Consider Leaving
the European Convention on Human Rights’; and T. Lock, ‘Legal Implications of Human Rights
Reform in the UK’ UK Const L Blog (15 May 2015), available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org.
11. See P. Mageean & M. O’Brien, From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good
Friday Agreement 22 Fordham Intl L. J. 1499 (1998).
12. For some issues see S. Egan & R. Murray, A Charter of Rights for the Island of Ireland: An
Unknown Quantity in the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, 56 Intl & Comp. L. Q. 797 (2007).
13. See, in the Republic of Ireland, the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003; and Art
29 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, and the European Communities Act, 1972.
14. On the role of European standards see, e.g., B. Dickson, The European Convention on Human
Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford University Press 2010).
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Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on
grounds of inconsistency.15
In developing these points, this chapter starts with a short section that addresses
the question whether UK withdrawal would result in increased power in the context of
devolution, and whether that would be beneficial for the Northern Ireland institutions.
It thereafter divides into three sections on the ‘problem’ of consociationalism;
North/South intergovernmental relations; and equality and rights. The section on
equality and rights also touches upon broader issues of constitutional reform in the UK
post- the Scottish referendum of 18 September 2014, and considers whether the
devolved legislatures might themselves choose to give ‘local’ domestic effect to the
ECHR. The conclusion offers some more general comments about Northern Ireland’s
place within the UK’s contemporary constitutional structures.
§3.02 EU MEMBERSHIP AND NORTHERN IRELAND: BETTER IN, OR
BETTER OUT?
The question whether EU membership is a positive or a negative in the context of
devolution is one that has been touched upon in much of the extant literature on
regionalism in the EU.16 Although that literature does not provide an agreed answer to
the question – preferences about membership and regionalism inevitably have a
subjective element – it draws attention to a number of constitutional and political
factors that determine how devolved power is to be accommodated within the EU’s
institutional framework. Perhaps the best known of these is the rule whereby the
internal constitutional arrangements of a Member State are not to be affected by EU
law, at least insofar as EU law neither requires the devolution of power nor prescribes
minimum levels of power where devolution occurs.17 In historical terms, this state-
centric focus is consistent with the international law origins of the (now supranational)
EU legal order, and it still takes form in, among other things, Article 258 TFEU. That
Article famously provides the legal basis for the European Commission to initiate
infraction proceedings against Member States, including in those circumstances where
the infraction has been caused by the actions or inactions of a regional, or devolved,
authority.18 In such circumstances, the Member State government will be the named
respondent in the proceedings and, should the infraction be proven, it is the Member
State government that will potentially be subject to any fines that may be imposed
under Article 260 TFEU. To guard against the financial imbalance that this might cause
within the UK where, for instance, the Northern Ireland institutions breach EU law, the
15. Paragraph 2 of Part 6 of the Agreement.
16. See, e.g., A. Cygan, Regional Governance, Subsidiarity and Accountability within the EU’s
Multi-level Polity. 19 Eur. Pub. L. 161 (2013) and references therein.
17. See further G. Anthony & A. Evans, Northern Ireland, Devolution, and the European Union, in
Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland 53 (C Harvey ed., Hart
Publishing 2001).
18. See, e.g., Case C-103/01, Commission v. Germany [2003] ECR I-5369.
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‘concordats of the constitution’ provide that the Northern Ireland institutions will be
responsible for the costs of proceedings.19
The concordats of the constitution also provide for devolved participation in EU
decision-making, where there is some overlap with EU Treaty guarantees on subsid-
iarity and regional input into the EU process.20 Of course, this is where the ‘in/out’
debate has most resonance for Northern Ireland, as a democratic critique of the EU that
starts with a state perspective may become even more compelling when developed at
the sub-state level. That said, such critiques often presuppose the validity of a state
based model of democracy, and it has been said that that model does not offer a
suitable means for assessing the legitimacy of the EU.21 The point here is that the EU is
now one actor among many in a much wider network of governance that engages
institutions found at the state, sub-state, European and global levels.22 While there is
some disagreement about the constitutional theory that best explains the nature of that
engagement,23 most commentators would accept that there are inextricable links
between the various sites of government and that devolved authorities should be
engaged in policy formation as equal partners where their interests overlap with those
of others.24 On this reading, withdrawal from the EU would be folly because it would
complicate the links that the UK would continue to have with other sites of authority
and also deny the Northern Ireland and other devolved institutions the power to project
their interests through, for instance, ‘national’ offices that are maintained in Brussels.25
The above analysis can, however, be criticised insofar as it presupposes that the
interests of the UK, including those of Northern Ireland, can only be protected from
within the EU rather than alongside it. This is certainly the essence of the political
argument that has been made in favour of withdrawal, which appeals to the imagery of
repatriating political power in a way that would allow the UK to take greater control of
its relations with the EU and the world at large.26 Whether this comports with current
constitutional realities is the remaining doubt about such an argument, but, if it is true
that power can be meaningfully repatriated, this could have far-reaching implications
for the Northern Ireland institutions. As was mentioned above, the competence of
those institutions is heavily conditioned by EU law and withdrawal may, in that sense,
19. ‘Devolution: Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements’, B4.25, available
at http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/memorandum_of_understanding_and_concordate_on_co-
ordination_of_eu_issues_-_march_2010.pdf. And see R. Rawlings, Concordats of the Constitu-
tion, 116 L. Q. Rev. 257 (2000).
20. Article 5 TEU; Prot 2 TEU; Articles 305–307 TFEU.
21. A. Moravcsik, Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39
Govt & Opposition 336 (2004).
22. N. Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism 65 Modern L. Rev. 317 (2002).
23. M. Loughlin, Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron? 3 Global Constitutionalism 9 (2014).
24. G. Marks, L. Hooghe & K. Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State Centric v. Multi-Level
Governance 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 341. But compare G. della Cananea, ‘Is
European Constitutionalism Really Multilevel?’ ZaöRV 70 (2010), 283–317, available at http://
www.zaoerv.de/70_2010/70_2010_2_a_283_318.pdf.
25. For the office of the Northern Ireland Executive see http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/
promoting-ni/onieb.htm.
26. See, e.g., I Milne/The Bruges Group, The Single Market and British Withdrawal, 2011, available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278491/
Bruges_Group_SingleMarketAndWithdrawal.pdf.
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‘free up’ localised policy initiatives under the Northern Ireland Act 1998.27 Indeed,
while it is axiomatic that the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 would need to be
amended in the event of withdrawal, any new settlement would surely mean the
devolution of more power, not less. This is particularly so given the political commit-
ments that were made in the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum of 18
September 2014, which amounted to a virtual promise to implement ‘devo-max’.28
While it remains to be seen quite how that increase in devolved Scottish power will
take form, centrifugal pressures within the UK constitution may well mean that
Northern Ireland (and Wales) might acquire more power as part of a broader
settlement driven by the Scottish experience.29 On this alternative reading, EU with-
drawal would dovetail with internal constitutional realignment to broaden significantly
the competences of the Northern Ireland institutions.
§3.03 THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF CONSOCIATIONALISM
The corresponding ‘problem’ that is presented by Northern Ireland’s consociational
structures starts with their emphasis on preventing the abuse of political power in a
society that is largely comprised of two ethno-national groupings. Northern Ireland’s
historical experience was one in which the majority British Unionist community
enjoyed hegemony over the minority Irish Nationalist community at levels that
included political representation, economic opportunity, and the workings of the
criminal justice system.30 The Belfast Agreement of 1998 then marked a fundamental
move away from that position by emphasising the principle of political equality that
now informs, among other things, the blocking mechanisms that are contained in the
Northern Ireland Act 1998.31 Those mechanisms are intended to ensure that one
ethno-national grouping cannot force a measure upon the other grouping where that
latter grouping’s core interests would be affected by the measure. This inevitably begs
the question of what constitutes an ethno-national interest, and Schwartz has sug-
gested that they cluster around the three themes of culture, the legacy of the Northern
Ireland conflict, and the core elements of the Belfast Agreement itself.32 However,
while the blocking mechanisms place strong controls at the heart of the Northern
Ireland Act 1998 in respect of those interests, it is apparent that the mechanisms can
also be used to limit socio-economic measures that may not easily (or at all) be linked
to ethno-national concerns. Against that backdrop, more power for the Northern
Ireland institutions may ultimately mean more vetoes.
27. See supra n. 3.
28. A. McHarg, ‘The Vow: Vote No for More Devo’ at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/09/17/
aileen-mcharg-the-vow-vote-no-for-more-devo/.
29. For proposals for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland at the time of writing see supra n. 4.
30. Views on the extent of the hegemony vary. For a balanced account see M. Mulholland, Northern
Ireland: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2003).
31. Although compare the much earlier – and unsuccessful – ‘Sunningdale Agreement’: see B.
Hadfield supra n. 1, at 110 ff.
32. Supra n. 6, at 3–4.
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The principal blocking mechanism is the ‘Petition of Concern’ that is provided for
by section 42 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. According to that section, thirty
members may petition the Assembly with their concerns about a measure that is to be
voted on by the Assembly, with the result that the measure can be passed only with
‘cross-community support’. ‘Cross-community support’ is here linked to designation
rules that require members to register themselves as ‘Unionist’, ‘Nationalist’ or ‘Other’
when they are elected to the Assembly, and it essentially means that an impugned
measure will be carried only where it attracts the support of a majority of both
Nationalist and Unionist members.33 While existing statistics on the mechanism do not
suggest that it has been used to frustrate a majority of the Assembly’s wider legislative
programme, there is clear evidence that it has been used to block discrete initiatives
that have affected ethno-national interests as well as some measures that have escaped
ethno-national association. Reform of planning law, noted above, is one example of a
measure that escaped such association; amendment of the law on abortion is another.34
Blocking mechanisms also exist in relation to exercises of Ministerial power,
where departmental portfolios are for the most part allocated on the basis of party
political strength in the Assembly and with reference to the so-called d’Hondt for-
mula.35 For instance, under section 28B of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, thirty
members may again petition the Assembly to express a concern that a Ministerial
decision would contravene the Ministerial Code of Conduct (which is statutory in
form36) or that it relates to a matter of ‘public importance’. Where such a petition is
brought, the decision in question is to be referred to the Executive Committee for
oversight, subject only to the Presiding Officer certifying, where appropriate and after
having consulted the political parties, that there is a matter of ‘public importance’.37
Moreover, under the Ministerial Code of Conduct itself, powers of decision can be
constrained in two further ways.38 The first is through the requirement that Ministers
bring to the attention of the Executive Committee decisions that, among other things,
cross-cut departmental interests, require agreement on prioritisation, require the
adoption of a common position, have implications for the Programme for Government,
33. Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 4(5)–5(A); and Order 3(7) of the Standing Orders of the
Assembly. Section 4(5) defines ‘cross-community support’ as (a) the support of a majority of
members voting, a majority of the designated Nationalists voting and a majority of the
designated Unionists voting; or (b) the support of 60% of the members voting, 40% of the
designated Nationalists voting and 40% of the designated Unionists voting’.
34. Schwartz, supra n. 6, at p. 4.
35. Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 18. But for the appointment of the First and Deputy First
Ministers see section 16A; and for the position in relation to the Minister of Justice see section
21A(3A), as read with the Department of Justice Act (NI) 2010, section 2.
36. Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 28A and, e.g., Re Solinas’ Application [2009] NIQB 43.
37. There are other procedural safeguards too: references must be made within seven days of the
decision being taken or, where appropriate, notified to the Assembly; and a decision may be
referred to the Executive Committee only once.
38. The text of the Code is available at http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/your-executive
/ministerial-code.htm.
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or are significant or controversial.39 The second way is through section 28A(8)(c) of the
Northern Ireland Act 1998, which requires that the Code provide:
if any three members of the Executive Committee require the vote on a particular
matter which is to be voted on by the Executive Committee to require cross-
community support, any vote on that matter in the Executive Committee shall
require cross-community support in the Executive Committee.40
It is important not to overstate the significance of such mechanisms, as govern-
ment in Northern Ireland has functioned almost without interruption since 2007 and
statistics on legislative productivity have been said to compare favourably to those in
Scotland.41 Nevertheless, it is also true that the blocking mechanisms can be used to
considerable effect and that, where there is a more general lack of political trust
between the various parties, government can enter a period of stasis. This was certainly
the case during the later months of 2014 when political disputes about issues ranging
from welfare reform through to the problem of dealing with Northern Ireland’s violent
past threatened to cancel one another out and create very real resource pressures
within the Northern Ireland departments. While the disputes were apparently resolved
by political agreements that were reached in December 2014 and November 2015 –
these envisage use of the petition of concern mechanism only in exceptional circum-
stances and where there is a statement to explain why it is being used – they still reveal
how the blocking mechanisms can almost undermine the very democratic purposes of
the Northern Ireland institutions themselves.42 If EU withdrawal were to entail
additional competence, the promised reform of the petition of concern mechanism may
therefore become a matter of very real practical need.
§3.04 NORTH/SOUTH INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
The North/South inter-governmental relations that were noted in the introduction
centre upon the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) and six ‘implementation
bodies’ that work in areas of ‘mutual interest’: Waterways Ireland; the Food Safety
Promotion Board; the Trade and Business Development Body; the Special European
Union Programmes Body; the Language Body; and the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish
Lights Commission. In formal terms, the NSMC and implementation bodies are
creatures of international law, as they have their origins in the UK and Irish govern-
ments’ commitments under the Belfast Agreement 1998 and British Irish Agreement
39. See paragraph 2.4 of the Code and, e.g., Re Central Craigavon Ltd’s Application [2011] NICA 17,
paragraphs 16–19.
40. In addition, see paragraph 2.12 of the Code.
41. Schwartz, supra n. 6 at p. 4. For details about a short period of interruption see http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-34426811.
42. See the ‘Stormont House Agreement’ 2014 and ‘A Fresh Start’, at supra n. 4. The Stormont House
Agreement’s provisions on the petition of concern are at paragraphs 57–58; the relevant part of
‘A Fresh Start’ is Appendix F3.
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1999, as subsequently implemented in domestic law.43 However, in political terms, the
NSMC and implementation bodies are best understood with reference to an Irish
Nationalist view of the Belfast Agreement insofar as they embody an all-Ireland
dimension to the governance of Northern Ireland (an East-West dimension, preferred
by Unionists, is provided for by the British-Irish Council44). While the NSMC does not
have executive power, it has assumed a prominent political role that is at its most
evident when the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the Taoiseach convene
‘plenary’ meetings.45 Otherwise, the great majority of the meetings are ‘sectoral’ and
held to consider the work of the implementation bodies and to discuss, though not to
decide, matters of policy in areas that include agriculture, education, the environment,
and tourism.46 Such sectoral meetings are (typically) to be attended by the Northern
Ireland Minister and Junior Minister with responsibility for the sector in question –
Ministers who will often reflect the ethno-national balance in the Assembly – and they
are under a statutory duty to participate in the work of the meeting insofar as relates to
their area of responsibility.47 Where the agenda for a meeting contains an item that is
‘significant or controversial’, it may also be attended by the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister even if the item in question does not fall within the responsibility of their
office.48
It is not difficult to envisage how UK withdrawal would complicate the work of
the NSMC and the implementation bodies. At a minimum, it would have implications
for cooperation in EU influenced policy areas such as agriculture and the environment,
as the Republic of Ireland would remain tied to EU policies and Northern Ireland would
not. While the extent of any differences between the two jurisdictions would, again,
depend upon the precise terms of UK withdrawal, the dynamics of cooperation would
inevitably change precisely because there would no longer be any mutual bind to EU
law. Indeed, those changed dynamics may become all the more remarkable if it were
to be perceived that post-withdrawal cooperation within the framework of the NSMC
was being used to foster policies that aligned Northern Ireland more closely to Irish
interests rather than those in the rest of the United Kingdom. This is essentially a
political point about the reservations that Unionists may have about increased coop-
eration on an all-Ireland basis, where recourse could again be had to the blocking
mechanisms in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. In that instance, there may well be a
debate about whether use of the ethno-national veto would be undermining the spirit
of the Belfast Agreement or safeguarding one set of the ethno-national interests that are
at the Agreement’s very heart.
43. See, in the UK, Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 52A–55, and the North/South Co-operation
(Implementation Bodies) (NI) Order, 1999, SI 1998/859; and see, in the Republic of Ireland, the
British-Irish Agreement Act, 1999.
44. Belfast Agreement, Part 5; and Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 52A. See V. Bogdanor, The
British-Irish Council and Devolution 34 Govt. & Opposition 287 (1999).
45. On the various formats for meetings see D. Birrell, Intergovernmental Relations and Political
Parties in Northern Ireland 14 Brit. J. Pol. & Intl Rel. 270, 277–278 (2012).
46. Belfast Agreement, Part 4.
47. Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 52A–52B. See also Part 3 of the Ministerial Code of Conduct,
available at http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/your-executive/ministerial-code.htm.
48. Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 52(A)(8), as read with section 20(3)-(4).
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Withdrawal would also have financial implications because it would, among
other things, end EU funding for the Special European Union Programmes Body. That
body has supported a large number of initiatives including those concerned with
cross-community reconciliation, and replacement funding would be needed if such
initiatives were to receive post-withdrawal support. That said, there would be the
potential for blocking mechanisms to be used here too if, for instance, a Northern
Ireland Ministerial decision to grant funding for a project were to attract controversy.
The point can be seen in relation to the earlier case of Re Solinas’ Application,49 which
involved a challenge to a Ministerial decision to withdraw government funding from a
community project in a Loyalist area of Belfast. The decision was taken because the
Minister – a member of the (Nationalist) Social Democratic and Labour Party – was of
the view that there was on-going paramilitary activity in the community and that that
activity was in breach of the conditions under which the money had been granted.
However, on an application for judicial review, the court found that the Minister had
acted unlawfully in making her decision as she had failed to adhere to a number of
procedural requirements that had earlier been laid down by the Executive Committee.
The court thus held that the Minister had breached the Ministerial Code and quashed
her decision.
§3.05 EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The remaining matter to be addressed is that concerned with equality and human rights
law. As indicated in the introduction, these are areas of law that have played an
important role in reshaping Northern Ireland society, where their influence can be
traced to before the signing of the Belfast Agreement of 1998.50 In terms of equality law,
the historical imperative has very much been the need to address the socio-economic
imbalances that were associated with Unionist hegemony, and section 75 of the
Northern Ireland Act 1998 addresses religious and political discrimination as well as
that associated with race, marital status, sexual orientation, gender, disability, and the
status of those with and without dependants.51 Section 75 is not, however, a stand-
alone provision in the context of addressing discrimination, as religious and political
discrimination is also governed by the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern
Ireland) Order 1998 (which replaced the Fair Employment [Northern Ireland] Act
1989), while the other categories noted in section 75 overlap with a range of EU Treaty
49. [2009] NIQB 43.
50. On equality law see C. McCrudden, Equality, in Human Rights, Equality, and Democratic
Renewal in Northern Ireland 75 (C. Harvey eds, Hart Publishing 2001); and on human rights see
Mageean and O’Brien, supra n. 11.
51. Section 75(1) reads: “A public authority shall in carrying out its functions relating to Northern
Ireland have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity – (a) between persons of
different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation;
(b) between men and women generally; (c) between persons with a disability and persons
without; and (d) between persons with dependants and persons without”.
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Articles and Directives that have been implemented in domestic law.52 That having
been said, there are some important points of difference between the various statutory
provisions, notably in relation to their reaches and effects. For instance, section 75,
which is to be read with Schedule 9 to the Northern Ireland 1998, applies only to public
bodies within the terms of the Act and is subject to an enforcement regime that centres
upon the powers of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland rather than judicial
remedies53 (albeit that judicial review can play a residual role in some cases; damages
are also available where a public authority discriminates or aids or incites another
person to discriminate on the ground of religious belief or political opinion).54 This
‘vertical’ approach can then be contrasted with that which applies in relation to the Fair
Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, which has ‘vertical’ and
‘horizontal’ dimensions and which fastens upon judicial remedies.55 The range of
related measures that have their origins in EU law likewise enjoy vertical and
horizontal effect, where access to judicial remedies is underpinned by EU law’s
principle of the effective protection of EU law rights.56
The starting point in terms of human rights law is the Belfast Agreement’s
emphasis on the need to safeguard rights at all levels of government in Northern
Ireland and in society more generally.57 That objective was subsequently given
legislative form both in the Human Rights Act 1998 – the passage of which coincided
with the Belfast Agreement – and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Of course, section 6
the Human Rights Act 1998 famously makes it unlawful for public authorities to act in
a manner that is incompatible with the provisions of the ECHR that have effect under
Schedule 1 to the Act, where public authorities are read as including the Northern
Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland government departments.58 However, it is the
Northern Ireland Act 1998 that reflects more fully the requirements of the Belfast
Agreement, as it embeds additional constraints on legislative and executive power at
the devolved level. While it is true that the Act includes an interpretive obligation
whereby the courts must try to read Acts of the Assembly as within its competence59 –
challenges to Ministerial decisions may also attract judicial restraint where that is
deemed appropriate60 – it is a commonplace that exercises of power may be con-
strained on the basis of European human rights norms. The legislative competence of
52. For example, the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland)
2003, SR 2003/497, as read with Directive 2000/78/EC. See further chapters 12-18 of Human
Rights in Northern Ireland: The CAJ Handbook (B Dickson and B Gormally ed, Hart Publishing,
2015).
53. Re Neill’s Application [2006] NICA 5, [2006] NI 278.
54. On judicial review see Re JR1’s Application [2011] NIQB 5; and on damages see Northern Ireland
Act 1998, section 76.
55. Re Kirkpatrick’s Application [2004] NIJB 15.
56. See, most famously, Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] 3 CMLR 240.
57. Part 6, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement.
58. Sections 6 & 21.
59. Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 83, as read in the light of Att-Gen v. National Assembly for
Wales Commission [2012] UKSC 53, [2012] 3 WLR 1294; Imperial Tobacco Ltd v. Lord Advocate
[2012] UKSC 61, [2013] SLT 2; and Re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43, [2014] 1
WLR 2622.
60. Department for Social Development v. MacGeagh [2006] NI 125, 136-8.
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the Northern Ireland Assembly is thus limited with reference to the ECHR/Schedule 1
to the Human Rights Act 1998 and by EU law (which includes the EU Charter);61 while
exercises of executive power are subject to related ECHR and EU law limitations.62
How, then, would a ‘withdrawal and repeal’ package of the kind that was noted
in the introduction affect Northern Ireland? Taking first the field of equality law, it
could be expected that any impact would be mixed, as various aspects of equality law,
most notably section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Fair Employment and
Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, would remain in force. Moreover, to the
extent that elements of the wider body of anti-discrimination law are sourced in EU
law, there is no reason in principle why the relevant domestic law measures could not
be kept in force and given a ‘domestic’ interpretation as cases arise in the future. This
is certainly the logic that underpins ‘transitional’ or ‘savings’ provisions in legislation
and, while repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 would obviously present
challenges on a larger scale, any Act that effects its repeal could easily include
Schedules of ‘saved’ secondary legislation. That said, there would inevitably also be an
element of fiction to any such arrangement, as the legislation that would be saved
would have been moulded by the case law of the CJEU, which would continue to give
(what would be) non-binding rulings about the EU measures that first underpinned the
‘domestic’ legislation. This would thus mean that the Northern Ireland courts would be
faced with the option of either ignoring the relevant rulings of the CJEU – which may
often include consideration of the Equality Chapter of the EU Charter – or affording
them the value of persuasive precedents. In the event that they (even occasionally)
adopt the latter approach, this would strengthen the well-established argument that
legal systems cannot fully close themselves off from one another in the modern global
polity and that they should not seek to do so.63
The repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 would of course end any direct role for
Article 14 ECHR in domestic proceedings, as well as for all of the Articles within whose
ambit Article 14 ECHR must fall in order to be actionable. In a UK-wide sense, this is a
prospect that should perhaps now be viewed against the backdrop of an increased
judicial emphasis on the role that the common law can play in protecting rights, where
the clear implication is that repeal may not lead to reduced levels of rights protection
but rather to a different means of achieving protection (there is also the fact that the
Human Rights Act 1998 may be replaced by a British Bill of Rights).64 However, in the
specific context of Northern Ireland, repeal may carry with it a very different conse-
quence given the UK government’s commitments under the Belfast Agreement 1998.
As was noted in the introduction, Part 6 of the Belfast Agreement requires the UK
government to incorporate the ECHR into Northern Ireland law and to provide for a
system of judicial remedies that includes the power to strike-down Assembly legisla-
tion. UK-wide repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 without more would therefore not
61. Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 6, 79–81, 83, 98.
62. Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 24, 98.
63. M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts Chapters 1–3 (Hart Publishing 1997).
64. On the common law see, e.g., R (Osborn) v. Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC 1115; and
Birkinshaw, Chapter one, this volume.
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only place the UK government in apparent breach of its commitments under the Belfast
Agreement but would also have a complicating effect on the scheme of guarantees that
are presently contained in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. In a practical sense – and
perhaps the most worrying sense of all – it would further mean that individuals would
no longer be able to rely upon European human rights standards in litigation arising
from state (in)action during the Northern Ireland conflict,65 albeit that there would
remain the option of petitioning the Strasbourg Court itself.66
It might be thought that there would be some way around such difficulties in
relation to human rights protection. For instance, on the assumption that the UK
government would remain as a contracting party to the ECHR notwithstanding the
repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998, its international law obligations might still be
given specific territorial effect in Northern Ireland (something that might also discharge
a narrow reading of the UK government’s obligations under the Belfast Agreement).
However, a matter of very real importance to any such territorially limited scheme
would be the meaning that would be given to ‘public authority’ within what would
become the statutory equivalent of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. While
almost all human rights cases in Northern Ireland would still be concerned with the
actions and inactions of public authorities that are seated in Northern Ireland (the
Police Service of Northern Ireland, local councils, etc), issues may also arise in relation
to decisions taken by central UK government departments. The most obvious area in
which this might cause concern is the investigation of conflict-related deaths that
involved members of the British Army, as the Ministry of Defence would be a party to
any potential proceedings. While it is presently accepted that Article 2 ECHR applies to
such cases even though the facts at issue pre-date the coming into force of the Human
Rights Act 1998,67 a statutory scheme that did not apply to central government
departments would end that possibility and may greatly complicate efforts to deal with
Northern Ireland’s past.68 Indeed, it is not hard to envisage that cases that may have
involved the police and the Army working in concert may result in only greater
uncertainty about what the state may have done: while the actions of the police would
be governed by the exacting standards of Article 2 ECHR, those of the Army would not.
The other possibility would be for the Northern Ireland Assembly itself to seek to
enact legislation to give effect to the ECHR. This is certainly something that the
Assembly might come to consider in tandem with the other devolved legislatures, as
the expected increase in devolved powers post-September 2014 may lead the Scottish
and Welsh legislatures to re-evaluate core civic values, including openness to European
influences. For instance, one model that might be adopted is that which has already
been used by the National Assembly for Wales in relation to the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child, where the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure
65. As in, e.g., Re Finucane’s Application [2013] NIQB 45.
66. For a recent conflict related application see McCaughey v. UK (2014) 58 EHRR 13.
67. Re McCaughey and Quinn [2011] UKSC 20, [2011] 2 WLR 1279. But compare R (Keyu) v.
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] EWCA Civ 312, [2015] QB 57, on
appeal to the UKSC at the time of writing.
68. On which efforts see G. Anthony & L. Moffett, ‘Law, Politics, and the “Problem of the Past”’
(2014) 20 EPL 395.
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2011 imposes a duty on Welsh Ministers to have ‘due regard’ to the UN Convention
when exercising their functions.69 However, even leaving aside the question of how far
such duties would be meaningfully enforceable in practice – it may be that Ministerial
decisions would be open to challenge only on grounds of failure to take relevant
considerations into account and/or Wednesbury unreasonableness70 – the constitu-
tional setting in Northern Ireland may ultimately frustrate attempts to give local
legislative effect to the ECHR. The point here is not just that consociationalism may
again problematise the passage of any Assembly Bill – the Unionist ethno-national bloc
tends to be less inclined towards the mobilisation of human rights arguments than the
nationalist bloc, at least where those arguments relate to Northern Ireland’s past71 – but
also that any clauses touching upon national security/anti-terrorism measures would
fall out-with the competence of the Assembly.72 In that scenario, it may well be that the
UK government’s failure to fulfil its obligations under the Belfast Agreement 1998
would be made only even more apparent by the Northern Ireland Assembly’s inability
to impose those obligations by proxy.
§3.06 CONCLUSION
This chapter began by observing that UK withdrawal from the EU might present
something of a paradox in the context of Northern Ireland. Certainly, the idea that
withdrawal might free up localised policy initiatives has been seen to be complicated
by a form of consociationalism that can frustrate responsive government as much as it
can facilitate it. In constitutional terms, this is perhaps an unavoidable consequence of
Northern Ireland’s history, where any increase in devolved power post-withdrawal
would have to be reconciled with the need to constrain competing ethno-national
preferences. Indeed, while it has been seen that the consociational system is (arguably)
open to abuse under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, it remains as one of the most
rudimentary features of the Belfast Agreement and is, in that sense, something of a
constitutional fundamental.73 Any increase in power – whether prompted by EU
withdrawal and/or a move towards ‘devo-max’ – would therefore have to face the
reality that democracy in Northern Ireland can sometimes be about nothing more
constructive than stopping things from being done.
Of course, such comments assume that EU withdrawal would result in a
meaningful repatriation of power at the UK level and that any internal reconfiguration
of the domestic constitution would have a centrifugal dynamic. While a centrifugal
dynamic would seem to be guaranteed given the experience of the Scottish referendum
69. Section 1.
70. On Wednesbury in the context of other due regard duties see, e.g., Re JR1’s Application [2011]
NIQB 5 (Chief Constable of the PSNI’s approach to his due regard duties under section 75 of the
Northern Ireland Act 1998 not unreasonable).
71. See generally C. Lawther, Truth, Denial and Transition: Northern Ireland the Contested Past
(Routledge 2014).
72. Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 2, paragraph 17.
73. On the constitutional link between the Belfast Agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 see
Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] NI 390.
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(and irrespective of EU withdrawal), the repatriation argument is one that is much less
convincing. As was noted in the earlier part of this chapter, it is almost axiomatic that
there are irreversible linkages between the various sites of government in contempo-
rary society and that states cannot realistically close themselves off as sovereign legal
orders.74 This raises the very real possibility that EU withdrawal would ultimately
become nothing other than the pursuit of a false sovereignty, and, for Northern Ireland,
the most worrying implication would be at the level of equality and human rights. Such
norms have long helped to define much of Northern Ireland’s transition from a difficult
and violent past, and they have become established as (admittedly contested) markers
of civil and societal values. Should they become diminished as part of some more
general UK retreat from Europe, it is not only Britain that would be ‘alone’ but the very
idea that common values can work to the benefit of all of society.
74. See generally R. Rawlings, P. Leyland & A. Young (eds), Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic,
European and International Perspectives (Oxford U. Press 2013).
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